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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
(REPORT

OFCOMIT EE E OF THE INSTITUTE. 1 )

WILLiAx N. GEmmILL, Chairman.
During the year, the committee has endeavored to collect certain
data concerning the procedure in the criminal courts and courts of appeal of the several states. Blank forms containing certain-queries were
sent to the chief justices of all of the appellate and supreme courts in
this country. The same forms were sent to many of the attorney generals and other prosecuting officers. Replies were received from every
state. In some instances the queries were fully answered, in others certain questions remained unanswered. From these answers and from a
further examination of the statutes of the several states, the committee
has ascertained that a gradual change has taken place in the United
States in the methods of prosecuting criminal cases.
I. At one time nearly every state in the Union, by statutory enactment, required that all criminal cases of the grade of felony should
be prosecuted by indictment. -Gradually many of the states have
changed this method of prosecution, so that to-day criminal prosecutions
are generally carried on in twenty-four of the forty-eight states by information: rather than by indictment. These states are as follows:
Indiana, Missouri, North Dakota, Colorado, Florida, Vermont, Arizona,
Idaho, Kansas, Connecticut, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington,
California, Wisconsin, Michigan, Utah, Nebraska, Nevada, Louisiana,
Wyoming, New Jersey,. Minnesota, Montana.
This list includes the states named in the report of 1910 by Committee "E" with the exception of Oregon, which in that report was
'The committee is composed of the following named gentlemen:

William

N. Gemmill, Municipal court, Chicago, chairman; A. C. Bachus, Municipal court,
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classed with the states prosecuting by information. Since that time,
however, the state of Oregon has turned back to its original method and
to-day felonies can be tried there only upon indictment. To the list of
1910, however, must be added the states of New Jersey, Arizona and
Nevada; New Jersey and Nevada having by recent legislative enactmen
changed their form of prosecution from indictment to information, and
Arizona having been admitted to the Union since the report of 1910.
In a few of the foregoing states it is still necessary that persons charged
with crimes the punishment of which may be death must be tried upon
indictment. This is the rule in Indiana, Connecticut and Louisiana.
In several of the foregoing states felonies may be tried either upon
indictment or upon information. Where both methods are allowed,
from ninety to ninety-nine per cent of the criminal cases are prosecuted
by information. In some states, such as North and South Dakota, Oklahoma and Michigan, a .grand jury has not been called in many counties
for from eight to ten years. In several states a constitutional amendment will be reqnired before there can be a change in the method of
prosecution from indictment to information. This is true in Arkansas,
Maryland, New Mexico, West Virginia, New Hampshire, Kentucky,
New York, Maine, South Carolina, Massachusetts, Delaware, Rhode
Island, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Texas and Tennessee. In a few of the state
constitutions it is provided that either of the two methods may. be
adopted. Other constitutions, as in Illinois and Iowa, provide that the
legislature may abolish the grand jury and provide for the tiial of all
criminal cases upon information. In nearly all of the states the rule
yet prevails that no substantial amendment can be made to an indictment after it has been returned by the grand jury. Some states by
legislative enactment have provided for minor amendments, and in the
following states substantial amendments may be made: California,
Mississippi, New Jersey, Oregon, New York, Wizconsin, Louisiana and
Connecticut. The usual practice in states where both methods of presentment are permitted, is that when an indictment has been quashed,
leave is given to the state's attorney to file an information, charging
the same offense set up in the indictment, and the trial proceeds at once
to conclusion upon the information. In this way no unreasonable delay
is permitted and substantial justice results.
Grand juries to to-day, while retaining all the powers they formerly
possessed as investigating bodies, do not as a matter of fact perform
such function to any large degree. The responsibility of investigating
an alleged crime rests upon the state's attorney or other prosecuting
officer. He is charged with the duty of preparing the evidence for pre-

WILLIAM N. GEMMILL

sentation to the grand jury and the grand jury usually hears only such
evidence as the state's attorney presents, and usually indicts or discharges the accused upon the recommendation of the state's attorney.
While in theory the indictment is prepared and drawn by the grand
jury, in fact it is prepared wholly by the state's attorney. If a mistake
is made it is the mistake of the state's attorney, and not the mistake of
the grand jury; yet the ancient rule prevails that an error in an indictment cannot be cured by an amendment, because the indictment being
the work of the grand jury, can be amended only by the act of that
body. The prosecution therefore fails. There can be no doubt but that
much more satisfactory results would be obtained by throwing the responsibility where it belongs, upon the state's attorney, and requiring
him, after he has investigated the evidence against the accused, to prepare the charge in the form of an information, which may be amended,
when such an amendment can be made in the interests of justice. Rare
instances may occur, such as in cases of riot or wholesale corruption,
where an investigation of the evidence can be made by a grand jury
with greater success than would attend the work of the state's attorney.
But these instances will be most infrequent.
This committee therefore endorses the recommendation of the committee of this association for the year 1910, and urges that such legislation be had in the several states as will secure the right of every state to
prosecute those accused of crimes either upon information or indictment, and the committee urges that where the method of prosecution
by indictment is retained, provision should be made in the law for substantial amendments to such indictments, wherever such amendments
can be made in the interests of justice.
II. From the reports obtained from the several states, it is apparent that by far the largest number of reversals in criminal cases by
courts of appeal has been due to erroneous instructions given to the jury
by the trial court. An examination of the methods of instructing juries
in the -criminal courts of the several states has revealed the fact that
where written instructions are given, reversals on account of erroneous
instructions have been much more frequent. In the following states
written instructions only are permitted in criminal cases: Illinois,
Delaware, Colorado, Missouri, Texas, Washington, Nevada, Iowa, Idaho,
Montana, Mississippi, Kansas, Wyoming, Florida, Oklahoma, Utah, New
Mexico, West Virginia, Oregon, Nebraska, Kentucky, and Maryland.
Oral instructions in criminal cases are usually given in the following states: Vermont, South Dakota, New Hampshire, New York,
Maine, South Carolina, Massachusetts, Georgia, Rhode Island, Louisi5I8
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ana, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. Either oral or written instructions may be given in the following states: Maine, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Arizona, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, North Dakota, Arkansas, New Jersey, and Minnesota.
From inquiry it has been ascertained that- wherever both methods
of instructing juries may be used, it is the usual practice to instruct
orally, although the presiding judge has the right to determine which
method will be adopted. In England, the judges holding criminal court
exercise greater power. in charging juries than is permitted in any of
the states in this country. There the judges not only instruct the jury
orally as to the law, but are given wide latitude in charging the jury as
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. But
few of the states in this country have granted such power to trial judges.
In the following states the trial judge is permitted to comment upon
the facts in criminal cases: New Jersey, Vermont, New Hampshire,
New York, Maine, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Ohio, and
Kansas. In the jurisdictions, however, where oral instructions are permitted and exceptions allowed to be taken at any time to any part of
the charge after the jury has retired from the bar, reversals have been
but little less frequent than where instructions are in writing.
One of the questions propounded -to the chief justices of *the several
states was as follows: "Give as nearly as you can, the percentage of
reversals by courts of appeal in criminal cases of your state for the last
five years." A few of the presiding judges did not answer this question.
Others answered the question by stating that they had no exact informa-.
tion upon the subject and could give only an estimate. The only states
from which the figures given purport to be based upon an actual count
of the criminal cases before the court during the last five years are as
follows: Wisconsin, Michigan, Illin6is, Iowa, California, New Hamp-.
shire, Georgia, Massachusetts, Kansas and South Dakota. The following are the figures given by the presiding judges of the several courts:
Per cent.
...................... 30
illinois .......................... 37.4

Per cent.
Arizona .......................
15
Washington .................... 25

Iowa ...........................
M ichigan .....................
Massachusetts ..................
New Hampshire ................

North Carolina ................. 30
Idaho .......................... 2
Georgia ........................ 16
North Dakota .................. 35

Wisconsin

26
31
23
22

Kansas ........................ 20

M ontana

South Dakota .................. 30

Mississipp4 ..................... 15

California

Wyoming ...................... 12

..................... 20

South Carolina ................. 25

....................... 30

Florida ...................

30

WILLIAM N. GEMMILL
Per cent
M aine .........................
1
Delaware ......................
0
Louisiana ......................
10
Colorado .......................
40
Ohio ...........................
10
M issouri : ......................
40
Texas ..........................
30
Tennessee ......................
10
Minnesota ...................... 20

Per cent.
Oklahoma ......................
30
Utah ...........................
45
Arkansas ......................
25
Maryland ......................
20
New M exico ................... 20
Vermont .......................
5
W est Virginia ................. 40
Oregon .........................
22
Kentucky ..................... .10
The effort to ascertain the exact percentage of criminal cases reversed by the several courts has emphasized the pressing necessity for
some system whereby actual statistics may be collected and preserved
by the proper officers of the several states. But few states have made
any effort whatever to collect reliable statistics. In Ohio, Illinois, Texas,
Tennessee, N~orth Carolina, Iowa and Wisconsin, some effort, is now
being made along this line, which is most encouragnig.
Comparisons have frequently been made of the work of the English and American courts. It is frequently asserted that owing to the
greater freedom exercised by the judges in the trial of criminal cases
in England, substantial and reversible errors seldom are made. This
conclusion is not based upon the facts. The following table shows the
work of the English Court of Criminal Appeals, which was established
in England in 1907 and which heard its first case in Alay, 1908:
Number of appeals heard and decided from May 1908 to April 3rd,
1912 ................................. :....................... 676
Applications for appeal refused .....................................
180
Total before the court since its creation .........................
856
The 676 appeals decided were disposed of as follows:
Affirmed ..........................................................
330
Sentences quashed and defendants discharged .......................
168
Sentences reduced ................................................. 174
Sentences increased ................................................
4
Sentences quashed because of misdirection of jury ...................
103
Sentences quashed because of insufficient or improper evidence ....... 29
Sentences quashed because defendant was found not guilty .........
21
Percentage of judgments vacated based upon appeals heard ..............
51%
Percentage of judgments vacated based upon appeals heard and applications refused ...................................................... 40 %
The English Court of Criminal Appeals has no power to remand a
criminal cause for a new trial. This is clearly a weakness in the present
constitution of that court and the court has frequently expressed its
regret at being unable to remand the defendant for a new trial where
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it was evident he was guilty. A serious effort is noF being made to
secure an amendment to the Court of Appeal's Act, granting to the
court the power to remand a cause for new trial. There is no absolute
right of appeal in criminal cases in England. When a conviction occurs,
a defendant wishing to have a review of his cause must ask the trial
court for an appeal; if this is refused he may then apply to the Court
of Criminal Appeals, which may or may not grant the application. In
more than fifty per cent of the one hundred and three cases wherein the
reviewing court reversed the judgment of the trial court because of misdirection to the jury, the misdirection consisted of a misstatement of
the evidence; this misstatement often consisted of a failure to place before the jury such evidence as was of advantage to the accused and of
emphasizing the evidence against the accused.
Another question that was asked the chief justices of the several
states was: "What was the most frequent cause of reversals in such
cases ?" Such answers as were given are as follows:
Kentucky: Error ininstructions and in admitting evidence.
New York-: Errors in instructions.
Texas: Errors in charge.
South Carolina: Errors of the trial judge who sometimes inadvertently expresses himself upon the facts.
Colorado: Erroneous instructions.
Connecticut: Erroneous instructions or improper evidence.
Wyoming: Errors in instructiong and prosecutors in insisting on pressing

doubtful questions.
Florida: Errors in charges to the jury.
New Mexico: Erroneous instructions.
Oregon: Erroneous instructions and error in the admission of evidence.
Nebraska: Errors in instructions.
Mississippi: Improper instructions.
Kansas: Errors in instructions and admission of evidence.
Minnesota: Improper instructions and insufficient evidence.
Arizona: Erroneous instructions and admission of evidence.
North Dakota: Improper and prejudicial instructions and the admission
of incompetent evidence.

California: Erroneous instructions and admission of evidence.
Idaho: Improper instructions.
Missouri: Improper instructions.'
North Carolina: Erroneous charge to the jury and improper instructions.
Nevada: Error in instructions and faulty indictments.
Georgia: Errors in instructions and admission or rejection of evidence.
Two hundred forty-one felonies heard, thirty-seven reversed.
Washington: Error in instructions.
West Virginia: Erroneous instructions.
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Iowa: In 199 appeals, 53 were reversed; 18 for erroneous instructions, 11
for insufficient evidence, 9 for erroneous admission or exclusion of'evidence.
Illinois: The guilt of the defendant had not been clearly established; erroneous instructions and improper admission or rejection of evidence; conduct of
the trial court or counsel.
Michigan: Over-zealousness of prosecuting attorney, being allowed to make
statements that he ought not to make.
South Dakota: Incompetence of state's attorneys.
Vermont: The construction of some new statutes.
Maryland: Improper rulings on evidence.
Oklahoma: Unfairness in the ruling of the trial judge on material questions.
Wisconsin: Twenty-four out of 105 cases reversed; of this number S reversed on the merits; 6 for erroneous rulings on evidence, 13 for errors in instructions or refusal to instruct.
Louisiana: Improper arguments of district attorneys and erroneous rulings
of trial courts.
New Hampshire: Erroneous construction of statutes under which proceedings are brought.

It can but be apparent that a system which permits the attorneys
on either side to hand to the court an almost innumerable number of
propositions, oftentimes so cleverly drawn that the error in them may
not be easily detected, and require the judge in the short space of time
allotted to him for that purpose, to mark as "given" or "refused" all
of these propositions and to permit the defeated party to preserve an
exception on account of any defect which he may afterwards detect, in
an instruction given on behalf of his opponent or refused when offered
by him, cannot but make the trial a contest of wits rather than an honest effort to reach a just verdict and judgment.
The committee is of the opinion that it would not be wise to give to
trial courts the right to comment to the jury favorably or unfavorably
upon the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses; but recommends that such legislation be had as will give to the trial judge the
right to charge juries orally and to limit exceptions to such charge to
the specific objections made by counsel at the time of the charge, in thc
presence of the jury and before it has retired from the bar.
III. If punishment for crime is to operate as a deterrent, it must
be summary. England denied the right of appeal in criminal cases
until the creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907. Since the
establishment of that court its efficiency has frequently been proven and
its need demonstrated. The right, however, to appeal in any criminal
case should be made to depend upon the case itself, and should be denied
unless the party appealing can show to the court some good reason for
the step taken. In most of our states there is no abridgment of the
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right to appeal in criminal cases. In some states, however, an appeal
or writ of error can be prosecuted only after the court, to which the
appeal is taken, or from which the writ of error springs, has found that
there is probable cause that substantial error was committed in the
trial court.
Section 3 of the English Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, is as follows:
"3. A person convicted on indictment may appeal under this Act to the
Court of Criminal Appeal"1st: Against his conviction on any ground of appeal which involves a
question of law alone; and
"2nd: With the leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal or upon the certificate of the judge who tried him that it is a fit case for appeal against his conviction on any ground of appeal which involves a question of fact alone, or a
question of mixed law and fact,-or any other ground which appears to the court
to be a sufficient ground of appeal; and
"3rd: With the leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal against the sentencepassed on his conviction, unless the sentence is one fixed by law.
"4.-(l) The Court of Criminal Appeal on any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should be
set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or that it cannot be supported
according to the evidence, or that the judgment of the Court before whom the
appellant was convicted should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision
of any question of law, or that on any ground there -vas a miscarriage of justice; and in any other case they shall dismiss the appeal; provided that the
Court may, notwithstanding that they are of opinion that the point raised in the
appeal might be decided in favor of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they
.consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.
"(2) Subject to the special provisions of this Act, the Court. of Criminal
Appeal shall, if they allow an appeal against conviction, quash the conviction
and direct a judgment and verdict of acquittal to be entered.
"(3) On an appeal against sentence the Court of Criminal Appeal shall, if
they think that a different sentence should have been passed, quash the sentence
passed at the trial, and pass such other sentence warranted in law by the verdict
(whether more or less severe) in substitution therefor as they think ought to
have
been passed; and in any. other case they shall dismiss the appeal.
. "5.-(l)
If it appears to the Court of Criminal Appeal that an appellant,
though not properly -convicted on some count or part of the indictment, has been
properly convicted on some other count or part of the indictment, the Court may
either affirm the sentence passed on the appellant at the trial, or pass such sentence in substitution therefor as they think proper, and as may be warranted in
law by the verdict on the count or part of the indictment on which the Court
consider- that the appellant has been properly convicted.
"(2) Where an appellant has been convicted of an offense and the jury
could on the indictment have found him guilty of some other offense, and on'the
finding of the jury it appears to the Court of Criminal Appeal that the jury
must have been satisfied of facts which proved him guilty of that other offense,
the Court may, instead of allowing or dismissing the appeal, substitute for the
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verdict found by the jury a verdict of guilty of that other offense, and pass such

sentence in substitution for the sentence passed at the trial as may be warranted
in law for that other offense, not being a sentence of greater severity."

It is common practice in many of the states to-day, for one convicted
of a crime to appeal at once and secure a supersedeas by giving a bond
permitting him his liberty until the cause has been finally determined
by the reviewing court. Oftentimes the most flagrant violators of the,
law are thus permitted to prey upon the community for from one to
five years pending the final disposition of their causes in courts of appeal.
The right to appeal should be limited to cases'where the trial court has
certified that the case involves doubtful and uncertain questions of law
or fact which should be determined by the court of appeal, or where the
court of appeal upon an application to appeal should h6nd for any reason
that the cause is one where an injustice may have resulted to the
appellant.
The committee therefore recommends that such legislation be
enacted in the several states as shall limit the right of appeal to such
defendants as shall secure from the trial judge a certificate reciting
that the cause is one which contains some doubtful or uncertain question of law or fact, or that for some other reason it is one which should
be reviewed by the court of appeal. Failing to secure such certificate
such defendant should then apply to the court of review for the right to
appeal, and such court shall grant such appeal only when it shall be of
the opinion that the case is one where an injustice has been done.
IV. Paragraph 3 of Section 4 of the English Criminal Appeals
Act provides that when an appeal is heard, if the court thinks that a
different sentence should have been passed, it may quash the sentence
passed at the trial and pass such other sentence as may be warranted in
law by the verdict whether more or less severe in substitution therefor.
This is an exceedingly broad provision and gives to that court a power
which has enabled it to do justice by passing different sentences from
the ones passed at the trial in twenty-five per cent of the cases before
the court. Under the common law, an appellate court had power only
to affirm or reverse a cause. Nearly every state of the Union has modified the common law in this regard. In some states, appellate courts
are given power to amend the judgments of the trial court in criminal
cases by passing proper sentences where through mistake or inadvertence
an improper sentence was passed. This is substantially the rule to-day
in the following states: Michigan, Georgia, Mississippi, New York,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Nebraska, Colorado and Alabama.
None of the courts, however, in the above named states have the power
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to reduce or increase penalties imposed by the trial court when, in the
judgment of the court; such action should be taken in the interest of
justice. There is no good reason, however, why the broader powers
granted in the English Criminal Appeal Act should not be exercised by
the appellate courts of this country. Such a power wisely exercised
would do so much to lessen the number of cases reversed by the courts
of appeal.
The appellate courts of the following states have the right to reduce
penalties whenever in the opinion of the court such a course may be
followed in the interest of justice: Iowa, North Dakota, Arkansas and
Nebraska. The plan has worked well in these states.
All criminal codes pronounce against the specific crimes enumerated
in them. The penalties which these codes prescribe are directed against
the crime committed and not against the individuals who commit the
crimes. No law was ever enacted which could operate automatically
and do justice, because no two men having committed the same offense
and living under different surroundings, are equally guilty. To the
consideration of every criminal case must be brought all the circumstances of the crime, including the environment of the accused, and to
the accomplishment of this task may well be added the earnest and.
conscientious efforts of a court of review. A court of criminal appeals
will always operate as a check upon: ill-considered judgments of trial
courts, and it should have the power not only to reverse such cases when
such a course is demanded, but to set aside the erroneous judgments
and enter proper judgments where this may be done in the interests of
justice to all concerned. It often happens that persons are severely or
lightly punished, depending upon the particular judge or particular
jury before whom their cases are tried. An appellate court with power
to rectify such inequalties of punishments would be a most potent instrument of justice and would bring'about a proper standardization of penalties.
To this end the committee recommends that not only should courts
of criminal appeal have the power to reduce or increase penalties without reversing causes, where in their judgment such a course is proper,
but likewise have the power to set aside the judgment and sentence of the
court and pass such other sentence as is warranted by the evidence, having due regard for the rights of all parties involved.
17.
The presumption of innocence that obtains in criminal prosecutions is evidence introduced by the law in favor of the accused. This
evidence may be overcome by facts admitted or proven upon the trial.
The office of a presumption is not to overthrow admitted facts but to
575
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supply the absence of facts. This function ceases the moment the facts
are ascertained. A judgment of conviction by a competent court is a
solemn determination of the facts overthrowing the presumption of
innocence. From this time the only presumption that arises is one of
guilt. Courts of appeal should set aside such a judgment only when
from a full consideration of the cause, a reasonable doubt exists as to
the guilt of the accused. The presumption of innocence permits the
accused to stand mute before the trial court without having his motive
questioned. When, however, he voluntarily seeks a court of review and
there pleads his innocence as a reason why the judgment of conviction
should be overthrown, he should be required to submit himself and his
cause to such further inquiry as that court sees fit to make. New trials
are frequently urged upon the ground of newly discovered evidence.
This evidence is submitted to the court by means of affidavits, which
usually have no probative force. Courts of review should not only have
power to interrogate the accused touching his guilt or innocence but
should also have the power to examine such other witnesses presented
by the accused as the court may determine. The examination of the
accused or his witnesses should rest in the discretion of the reviewing'
court. The English Court of Criminal Appeal has frequently granted
the application of the accused to be heard in person and has more frequently interrogated witnesses offered in his behalf. In many of the
cases before that court the-judgment of conviction was set aside because
of new evidence thus submitted; in many others the judgment of conviction was affirmed in cases where a doubt had arisen in the minds of
the court as to the guilt of the accused. The right of the court to hear
further evidence upon appeal in criminal cases has long been the established law of Mfaine and of North Carolina.
The committee therefore recommends that such legislation be
enacted as will give to courts of review the power-to examine the accused
under oath and to hear the evidence of such other witnesses offered on
behalf of appellant as the court may elect.
ATI.
No uniformity exists in the procedure of the several states in
reference to the use of the writ of habeas corpus. This ancient writ
had its -origin at a time ante-dating the Magua Charta, when life and
liberty were held in slight esteem by governments and courts. At no
time, however, since its origin has its legitimate function been to secure
a review of mere errors or irregularities, either as to substantive rights
or as to the method of procedure in trial courts. Its sole legitimate purpose is to free the petitioner from an illegal restraint. The judgment of
a court of competent jurisdiction, although erroneous, is binding upon
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all parties unless reversed and no court of concurrent jurisdiction can by
means of the writ of habeas corpus look beyond the judgment for the
purpose of re-examining the charge or the method of procedure upon
which it is based. Errors and irregularities which do not render the
proceedings void are not open to review by -the writ of habeas corpus.
The remedy in such case is by appeal, writ of error or exceptions. In
most jurisdictions the right of the state to appeal from a judgment in a
habeas corpus proceeding is denied. This has given rise to startling
abuses in many states. Courts of concurrent jurisdiction frequently
review each other through the medium of a writ of habeas corpus. This
is done in flagrant disregard of the law. Most of the states have enacted
statutes upon this subject. Some provide for a review by either party,
either by appeal, writ of error or exceptions. In one or two states the
court upon entering a judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding is required
to certify questions of law presented by either side to the court of appeal.
In the following states the right of appeal is granted by statute to both
parties from a judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding: North Carolina,
Tennessee, Georgia, New York, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Connecticut,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Alabama, Indiana, Vermont, Michigan and Texas.
In other states the right to review up6n the application of either party
is limited to the consideration of certain questions affecting property
rights.
The committee recommends the enactment of such legisaltion as
will give to both sides, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the right to apply
to an appellate court for a review of the judgment, either by appeal,
writ of error, certiorari, exceptions, or by a certification of questions of
law.
APPENDIX TO REPORT OF COMMITTEE E

WILLIAM E. HEIGGINS,

OF THE INSTITUTE; DISSENT.

University of Kansas.

The writer concurs in all but recommendations two and four of
the Report of the Committee, and submits the following in opposition
to the two named:
I. Recommendation two is as follows:
"That such legislation be had as will give to trial judges the right to charge
jurors orally and to limit exceptions to such charge to the specific objections
made by counsel at the time of the charge, in the presence of the jury and before
it has retired from the bar."

The recommendation is:
First: A license to the trial court to err with a minimum danger of being
detected by counsel and reversed by the reviewing court;
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Second: An additional burden which the accused should not be compelled
to bear;
Third: A premium upon the ingenuity of defendant's counsel to devise
specific objections so as to influence the jury before it retires for deliberation.
The recommendation is divisible into three parts:
1. That the charge be oral;
2. That only the trial court prepare the instructions;
3. That exceptions be limited to such objections as are:
a. Made immediately -following the charge and before the jury retires,
and,
b. In the jury's presence.
First: Shall the charge be oral?
The writer does not believe that oral are better than written instructions, where the following rules are in force:
1. Error, to be reversible, must be prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused;
2. Such errors must either affirmatively appear or the langtuage of the instruction must be such that the reviewing court is unable to say that
the jury was not misled;
(Note-Practically, in some courts, this amounts to the rule that the
language must be of doubtful construction, one that may have erroneously affected the substantial rights of accused, or, it must have affirmatively appeared to have that effect).
3. The instructions must consist of specific applications of the law to the
concrete, ultimate facts of the case, and not of -mere abstract propositions of law;
4. The reviewing court must test each instruction in connection with the
other instructions, regarding the charge as a whole.

On the other hand, the writer believes that written instructions
serve the following useful purposes:
1. To compel the trial court to avoid loose and misleading language;
2. To secure greater effort upon the part of the trial court to prepare his
instructions so as to cover the whole of the case in the interests of
substantial justice;
3. To secure the aid of the criticism and suggestions of counsel, wherever
the instructions are submitted to counsel before being given to the
jury.

Juries often attach great weight to every word of the trial court
in a criminal case; hence, looseness of expression should be avoided. In
this day of court stenographers, it is no great burden for the court to
dictate the language of his instructions prior to giving them to the jury.
Second: Shall the court alone prepare instructions?
With this the writer agrees, provided, such instractions are submitted to counsel for criticism and suggestion before they are given to
the jury, and, provided further, that the court is required to instruct

APPENDIX

upon all the vital points of the case. The right of counsel to aid the
court by the preparation and presentation of instructions involving
defendant's theory of the case has often operated, either intentionally or
unintentionally, as a "pitfall" for the court, either by artful language
or by the multitude of the instructions. In spite of the rule established
by reviewing courts that instructions must be limited in number to the
requirements of each case, trial courts have been subjected to the burden
of examining many instructions prepared by counsel, until it has become
a custom with some courts to "refuse" all such instructions and cover
their substance in instructions of the court's own devising. It may be
well, therefore, in jurisdictions where such difficulty exists, to deprive
counsel of the right to prepare and present instructions. But aid from
counsel can be secured by granting the right to inspect the court's
instructions and to make criticisms and suggestions. The problem of
reform is not how shall reversals be prevented by allowing the trial court
more latitudb to err with less danger of detection, but, how shall substantial justice be done without reversals which do not affect the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Counsel can often
aid by criticism and suggestion, even though these be wrung unwillingly
from counsel. For states in which it is the practice to offer numerous
or artfully drawn instructions, the writer proposes the following:
The trial court alone shall prepare written instructions to cover
every vital feature of the case, and, when requested, submit them to
counsel for criticism, giving reasonable opportunity for that purpose.
It shall not, however, be error for the trial court to refuse to follow such
criticismr or suggestions.
The Kansas code of Civil Procedure provides that in civil cases the
court shall, upon request of counsel, give reasonable opportunity to
inspect the instructions, and this provision might well be made the rule
in criminal cases, with the added provision that the court shall prepare
All of the instructions.
It is not clear from the committee's recommendation whether
reversible error shall be limited to errors of commission in the instructions given and whether the recommendation does not include errors of
omission-failures to cover some vital part of the case. To allow him
to instruct upon such parts only as he pleases would encourage carelessness and lack of effort in the trial court.
Third: Shall exceptions be limited to such objections as are:
a. Made immediately following the chargu and before the jury
retires; and,
b. in the jury's presence.
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The above has the following objectionable features :
1. It does not give sufficient time for the formulation of specific objections
sufficient to constitute the basis of an exception;
2. It will, as a matter of practice, require counsel to make numerous objections, not in the hope of securing a reversal, but as an absolute safeguard to preserve defendant's rights;
3. It will subject counsel to the danger of unreasonable prejudice of jurors
because of the very number of objections, which he may be compelled
to make; and,
4. It will place before the jury conflicting views of the law and the facts,
thus tending to deprive the trial court of his present power to declare
the law of the case, and it will, practically, make the jury the judge
between the conflicting views of the court and of counsel.

The provision will not give sufficient time for the formulation of
specific objections, for the reason that counsel's impressions of the court's
language cannot be made the basis of an exception, since the reviewing
court will require that specific objection be made to specific language,
and sufficient time is not given for this purpose by this provision. The
instruction of a jury should not be a baseball game, in which the court
"bats" his ideas to the jury under a rule that. errors must be "caught
on the fly" or that he will be thrown out at the "home plate" of the
reviewing court by an error fielded without an instant's hesitation.
The recommendation will require numerous oral objections in order
to safeguard the rights of accused, and at the same time, defendant will
be subjected to the prejudice which juries so often have to the numerousness of objections made by counsel.
The provision will place before the jury the instructions of the trial
court and the specific objections of counsel in such a way that the jury
will retire to the jury room in possession of conflicting views of the court
and of the counsel, and some jurors will undoubtedly question the court's
instructions in view of counsel's specific objections. No better opportunity could be devised whereby adroit counsel might take advantage of
the well known fondness of a certain class of jurors to take the law
into their own hands in spite of the juror's oath to follow the law as
given by the court. Especially will this be true in cases involving
sympathy on account of matters not strictly in evidence but apparent to
the eyes and ears of those who sit in the court room. The jury room
should not be the forum of the contending views of the court and of
counsel, but it is to be feared that this provision will make it such.
Finally, the object of reform is to do justice, and not to minimize
the danger of reversing trial courts because of substantial error.
Neither is it the object of reform to shift a burden unless the shift
results in substantial justice.
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Recommendation four is as follows:
"Not only should courts of criminal appeal have the -power to reduce or increase penalties without reversing causes, where in their judgment such a course
is proper, but likewise have the power to set aside the judgment and sentence of
the court and pass such other sentence as is warranted by the evidence, having
due regard for the rights of all parties involved."

I do not concur in this recommendation upon the supposition that,
as woried, it seeks to give to reviewing courts the power to find ultimate
facts of the case. To give any such court any such power, without having the witnesses before it, is to ignore entirely the unspoken, unwritten
facts, which so often affect the credibility of witnesses, but which are
apparent upon the stand. Reviewing courts might well be given the
power to give judgment where there is an absence of any evidence to
sustain an ultimate fact showing an element of an offense, as, for example premeditation, in murder in the first degree, and be allowed to give
judgment upon all the other ultimate facts showing other elements of
an offense included within the verdict of the jury, as, for example, murder in the second degree, where the jury has returned a verdict of guilty
of murder in the first degree. Under the language of the recommendation, however, the reviewing court might weigh the etidence and find
an ultimate fact not included within the verdict of the jury. With this
I cannot agree.
DISCUSSION.

The report was then opened for discussion.
chairman, said:

Judge Gemmill, the

"The report is printed and approved by all the members of the committee
excepting three, and partially approved by them. The committee did not attempt to cover the whole field of criminal procedure. It was the consensus of
opinion that we ought to confine our recommendations to a very few subjects,

and we therefore took up first what seemed to be the most important, and
that was the recommendation of a similar committee of this association two
years ago, recommending the change of method of presentation from indictment to information. We made a thorough investigation to see whether or
not any such changes were going on in this country. Twenty-fouri states now
prosecute nearly all criminal cases by information rather than by indictment.
Oregon, since the last report, has changed from information to indictment.
"The second topic that we took up is the method 'of instructing juries.
You probably cannot find two lawyers who will agree upon the method. Yet
we were able in this report to secure the endorsement of the recommendation
here, that oral instructions be given to juries, instructing only upon the law,
and that exceptions be allowed only when taken in the presence of the
jury. * * * Professor Higgins has filed a minority report touching this
question of instructions.
"I prepared a list of questions which I forwarded to the chief justices of
all the Supreme Courts in the United States and to many district and prose-
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cuting attorneys, and one of those questions was aimed at the most frequent
cause of reversals in their criminal cases. The answers are published in the
report. In nearly every state the cry was that the cause of reversal was
erroneous instruction. * * *
"One of the requests I made of the chief justices of the several courts
was to give me, if possible, the percentage of reversals in criminal cases in
their several states. This question was generally answered. Some of them,
like Chief Justice Winslow in your own state, and Chief justice Carter, based
their answers upon exact information. This is true also of Indiana. In many
cases, however, the justices said that they had no exact data upon which to
make that answer, and their answer was merely an estimate. I wish especially
to call your attention to the table in the report showing the percentage of
above.)
reversals in criminal cases." * * * (See p.

"It has been said in the last few years, through the public press and otherwise, that owing to the absence of a handicap upon the judges in England who
try criminal cases, their decisions are seldom or never reversed.
"I examined the complete reports of the English Court of Criminal Appeals, which was established in 1907, and which went into operation May 1,
1908. Our report contains the results of that examination. The generally
accepted notion that English courts try their cases with greater certainty than
we do, and that their cases are seldom reversed is completely overthrown. As a
matter of fact there is a larger percentage of reversals in criminal cases in
above). ***
England than in any state in the Union save Colorado." (See p.
"I -will not add anything to what I have already said, excepting this, that
103 of the total number of cases reversed by the court of criminal appeals in
England were reversed because of misdirection of the jury, and in a very large
percentage of those cases the misdirection consisted in a misstatement of the
evidence by the trial judge, and the Appellate Court so holds and so states
in its opinion.
"This committee believes-I think the committee, with the exception of
Professor Higgins, was unanimous on thit question-that it is unwise to give
to trial judges in criminal cases, the right to comment upon the facts, or to
comment upon the guilt or innocence of the accused.' Certainly that has not
worked out very satisfactorily in England, if this record is to be taken as a
criterion. Judges should, however, have the right, and should be limited to
the right, of commenting upon the law and doing that orally, and requiring
exception to be taken before the jury has retired from the bar."
Professor Higgins: "My dissent is with reference to oral instructions. I
concur in the report of the committee, if the committee means that the judge
shall not be allowed to comment on the evidence. But I do maintain that an
instruction to the jury should contain what we call the ultimate facts in connection with the propositions of law. If these gentlemen in their report have
endorsed abstract propositions of law to be stated as instructions to the jury,
I am against it; I think that is out of the question. I think that one of the
causes of mistrials in this country is that judges in instructing juries, confine
themselves to.mere abstract propositions of law. And on the other hand, I
believe it would be most unwise to allow a man to sit on the bench and instruct
the jury as to what we call the evidenciary facts. That will be a large guide
582
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to the jury, who advisedly consider themselves very often as not competent to
judge of the evidence, and they will follow the voice, mind and gesture-of the
judge with respect to it.
"What I do mean is that every proper instruction to a jury should consist
of the abstract proposition of law applied concretely to the ultimate facts in
the case on each proposition. I feel strongly on this point after an investigation
covering a number of years.
"I believe that many judges and lawyers do not study scientific procedure
so that they understand the proper function of a trial, and they mix evidence
with operative facts in their pleadings and evidence with ultimate facts in
their instructions, to the confusion of our procedure and the ultimate reversal
of the case. That is the first proposition. I want to make myself clear. There
are certainly in procedure conclusions of law, ultimate facts put in issue by
the pleadings, and the evidenciary facts to sustain these ultimate facts. A scientific instruction and consideration of these matters by those men who sit
in-authority on the bench and those who practice at the bar, would tend very
largely to simplify procedure.
"I am opposed to the second recommendation for the reasons set forth
in
the report which you can read; hut I think that the report of the majority of
the committee is merely favorable to- this proposition: That no instruction
should be permitted to reverse a case, for if you can remove the opportunity
to catch the judge in what is admittedly an error in the case, you are simply
allowing the court more latitude to err. And, as I stated, this is merely license
to the trial court to err with the minimum chance 'of detection. Why not say,
let him err as much as he pleases and the jury will correct the errors? I do not
believe that in many jurisdictions the jury will correct the errors. In that
case why have instructions at all? Why not carry the proposition to its legitimate conclusion? I do not understand Judge Gemmill to maintain that proposition at all, of course, but I maintain that if you allow this you might as well
allow the rest of it and so let the court err as it pleases.
"But that is not my only objection to it. Before I proceed I want to say
that the proposition is not to allow the court to err and not be caught, but
how to avoid error and obtain the truth in the case. That is the object of
reform.
"To allow counsel to trap the court, is vicious; it must be avoided. In those
jurisdictions, therefore; where there is any practice on the part of the bar to
'ffer numerous instructions, with one proposition of law applied to the facts
under one form and then revamped under another, there obtains a well established practice of the court to refuse all instructions on the part of counsel
and to make them himself. If that is persisted in I concur in the advisability
of taking away from counsel the right to offer instructions to the court and
predicating error for refusal. But I do believe hat the bar of this country
should be brought to this standard, viz.: that before the court instructs the
jury the court should receive the criticism and advice of the attorneys at the
bar in that case, and that opportunity should be given to counsel, therefore, to
inspect the judge's instructions which he proposes to give on the ultimate facts
of each proposition of law. After the court'has recieved the criticism let him
do as he pleases; if he wants to take it, well and good.
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"Now, the objection to that is, on the part of some, that it consumes time;
that you must excuse the jury. But it is better to excuse the jury for a recess
and avoid error in a case than to have it sent-up and reversed or modified;
better to have a final determination of the question by a deliberate attempt to
get at the truth, than to labor wholly in the interests of finality and expedition
at the risk of reversible error. Therefore, I see no merit in the contention
that it will consume time. Under a wise guidance it will consume no more
time than is perfectly proper.
"I think that corrections- lie not so much in taking away from counsel the
opportunity to inspect and to predicate error in three or four days, but in saying this: that no error in instructions shall cause a reversal, unless it is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant and those other safeguards
which are here enumerated. If these be thrown around, it seems to me that
errors in instruction will be reduced to a minimum. But I want to return to
the proposition that if a court errs substantially in a case, and he has given
the ultimate facts in his instructions, so that the jury is sure to be bound by
the charge, and ought to be bound by it, then that case ought to be reversed.
We are not here in the interests of finality; reform is not merely disposing of
cases with expedition; it is to be just; and therefore no court should be allowed
to sit on the bench and misdirect a jury, and, in the slang phrase of the street,
'get away with it,' if it is fundamental and prejudicial. If we adopt the doctrine that all errors excepting certain ones specified, which do not affirmatively
appear to have prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant, shall be
resolved against the defendant's appeal, I think that we shall very largely avoid
the trouble.
'The doctrine of requiring an affirmative appearance of error on the part
of the defendant in the record, of course, will not be acceded to by a large
number of attorneys; whether it is wise or not is a question of debate. I am
myself slowly coming to the conclusion that that doctrine is a wise one and
that it will avoid a very large number of reversals.
"The reasons which you will find set forth in my dissenting report are
apparent to those who are in practice-will bear weight with some and will
not. bear weight with others. I think I can produce a long list of those who
are radically opposed to oral instructions.
"The second objection that I have to the point is this: I may' misunderstand the recommendation, but if exceptions are to be taken to an oral charge,
and those exceptions -are to be taken in the presence of the jury, an adroit
counsel can so shape his objections that his theory of -the case will go before
the jury; and I know from experience that in a good many trial jurisdictions
that that jury composed of men who know both counsellors will say:-'Well, I
tell you that I think in all common sense the contention of the counsel for
the defendant in this case is a more reasonable contention as to the law than
the contention of the judge; and I am going to follow it out here.' And you
will have transferred from the court room a contention over the law of the
case, in the jury room. I think that is the danger and that is my second
objection.
"Let me say in passing, that the very valuable table of the causes of
reversals secured by Judge Gemmill (and I want to say that Judge Gemmill
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has done a large amount of work in collecting the data) is not conclusive,
because of this fact: In my own state 20 per cent of reversals are due to erroneous instructions and omission of evidence, as stated by Chief Justice Johnson.
Our reversals are 20 per cent of the appeals; that 20 per cent of reversals is
composed of nearly 8 per cent of reversals in favor of the state on exceptions
taken by the state on what we call a question of reserve, not during the trial,
but, for instance, where an information has been quashed.
"So that we will have to go further and find out how many reversals were
reversals in favor of the state and not in favor of the accused, before we can
say that that is a bad showifig for these various states. I say that by way of
explanation.
"One other thing in conclusion. I think, gentlemen, that an investigation
of this kind is required and we absolutely need a simplified, uniform procedure
all over the country; but we absolutely need one thing especially with reference to our attorneys, prosecuting and defending. There should be in every
law school in this country a careful education in the fundamentals of practice.
I plead that those who are interested in criminal law shall insist that the men
who go to the bar for the plaintiff or for the defendant in criminal cases, shall,
first, be men who understand the differentia of a conclusion of law, an ultimate
fact made by the issues of the case, and the evidence to sustain it. The intermingling of those three things causes confusion- and works reversals. The
object of a trial is to get the truth. That is the ultimate fact in the case; and
if we confuse it with opinions which we should endeavor to avoid, as an opinion
is not an ultimate fact, error results. Let the evidence determine the ultimate
fact. Clear distinction in this regard constitutes a knowledge of the fundamentals of procedure.
"Second, we want to insist that these men not only have scientific knowledge in that respect, but that their legal ethics shall be such that they will want
to keep these things distinct and not intermingle them; and when we do that,
it seems to me that together with an investigation such as a committee like this
makes, we will have made a large step towards the solution of the determina'tion of the guilt or innocence of the accused, irrespective of passion or
prejudice."
Judge Russell, Oklahoma: "In my state we have the practice of information as well as indictment. We have no grand jury, excepting that which the
judge sees proper, upon his own motion, to convene, or which may be called
upon the application of 100 taxpayers. All crimes can be presented by information by the county attorney. We have no district attorney.
"Upon the subject of points applicable in instructions I have this to say:
A man is presented upon a charge of murder. That involves several degrees
of homicide. The court hears-the evidence. * * * And when it is concluded the jury is placed in charge of the bailiff, and the court asks whether
counsel on either side has suggestions to make in argument or propositions of
law to submit. If they have, well knd good; if not, the court retires and submits the law applicable to that case. If the offense of murder has not been
developed by the evidence it is a waste of time and paper to submit the law
of murder. If only the issue of murder has been presented by tle evidence
upon one side, and upon the other, self-defense to the accusation, submit those
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two propositions. If there is an intermediary current of manslaughter in a
case stripped of deliberate homicide, you submit the law applicable to that as
well. Now, there you have your three branches, murder, manslaughter, selfdefense. Abstract principles of law should never be encouraged; it is confusing. Only the law applicable to the case raised by the testimony should be
submitted. The law applicable to those facts should be submitted without any
comment on the part of the judge as to the weight of any particular fact. * * *
"Now, as to instructions. In our state they may be written unless counsel
consent to oral instructions. You have a jury of laymen, not of lawyers. The
judge gives out orally, principles of law to be submitted; the rights in the
case, and turns them over to counsel. Now, as Professor Higgins says, an
astute lawyer goes up and inserts his objection in a dogmatic fashion; the jury
has heard the oral instruction, but on that particular branch it has gone from
their minds, and what that attorney calls their attention to, dominates. When
they go to the jury room they have no written instructions;'they have to trust
to their memories; the last thing they have heard is something that sounds to
them good. They go out, but of course if they forget what is said they can
call for written instructions. But it won't do, in my judgment; time is always
saved when you hear the suggestions from your brother members of the bar
who are interested in the case. The court retires to his chambers, submits his
instructions; carbon copies, if you please, are handed to the lawyers. Let
them draw a cold-blooded bead upon it. If they draw it and you still maintain
the position asserted in the instructions after deliberate review and reflection
on what they have stated, it relieves the Supreme Court of a world of work.
A little extra time may be required down below, but you have saved time in
the long run. * * * By pursuing that practice of giving the attorneys the
opportunity to make their suggestions. In five years I have had no criminal
case reversed on instructions because of error. I never had a civil case reversed because of instructions. I give them time. * * *
"Of course in minor felonies where the issues are very simple, counsel say,
'we consent to oral instructions;' if the jury wants them drawn off they can
have them before they return their verdict, if they do not understand
them." * * *
Edwin M. Abbott, Philadelphia: "We have one system in the East with
regard to the charge of the court which I think should be preserved. In our
state and in many of the states of the East, all points submitted for charge
by counsel, must be handed in to the trial judge before argument begins; and
during all the course of the argument the trial judge has those points before
him. Then his charge is given; and under t he laws of the state of Pennsylvania, he is compelled to give a full, fair and equitable charge and a fair review
of the evidence. Our courts compel the judge also to review all the evidence
briefly; and then, if error is made, it is reversible error, if it has been prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. * * *
"Now, just as Judge Russell has said, the court gives the law applicable
to each case. He has a tried scientific mind and is supposed to know what
is the law in each particular case, and whether it is a case for the jury or not,
and how much of law there is to consider upon the facts presented. We try
cases upon evidence and only upon evidence, and the court charges the jury
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upon evidence, and then when the court goes wrong, we cannot say that there
was no wrong caused by a wrongful charge on the law. Our judges must
follow the law in their charges to the jury; and if the courts themselves have
gone astray, a written charge placed upon the record is the only proper way
by which it can be reviewed by the Appellate Court. I therefore am in favor
of the continuation of the written charge, so that in case wrong has been done
any defendant it may be cured by the Appellate Court."
Charles A. De Courcy, Boston, Mass.: "I wish to consider two very small
matters, and I shall not attempt to discuss the general proposition.
"This table in the report giving the number of reversals, is so important
and so likely to be quoted at large in these days when so much is said as to
the errors of trial courts, that I can but regret that the committee did not secure
the figures as well as the percentages. I cannot avoid thinking -that to the popular mind this table is misleading and exaggerated. Having in mind my own
state, the suggestion that 23 per cent of the criminal trials are reversed seems
startling; but when you know that that means that not more than 17 criminal
cases were tried in a year before the Appellate Court and not more than four
reversed, why, the popular conception of the efficiency of the trial court would
be very much different-four cases reversed rather than 23 per cent of the
cases. These four cases need to be further explained. It does not mean that
in all the four cases in which the finding of the trial court was reversed, the
county and the parties are put to the expense and delay of a new trial, by any
means. I should say one if not two of the four were reversed because the
law upon which the case was tried, the statute or ordinance with the violation
of which defendant was charged, is found by the Appellate Court to be unconstitutional. That is a question upon which the trial court would not presume
to act, of course. So that when you reduce this down to concrete figures, the
number of cases that are not only reversed but sent back for a new trial, as
I had occasion to know from an investigation made last year for the American
Prison Association, is a very small number of cases, not anything like such a
number as might be suggested when put into percentages."
President: "Did you notice that this covers 5 years?"
Judge De Courcy: "Yes. I had occasion to examine the situation in our
own state, and I think the number of criminal cases that went to the Supreme
Court did not exceed 17 a year in any year during the last 5 years, and I am
sure that in some years there were not that many."
President: "Your *percentage that you speak of was based on the last
year?"
- Judge De Courcy: "Yes, but the last five years show no substantial difference. I had occasion to go over the figures and I have them fairly well in
mind. They run from a dozen to eighteen cases a year, at the outside; and
the proportion of them that were reversed would not be more than four or
five of the dozen to eighteen.
"No-v, the comments here upon this matter of instructions perhaps seem
a little strange to one who has never known the practice of written instructions. With an- experience of thirty years at the bar and bench I have never
heard any complaint made against oral instructions; have never known anything else. Of course the stenographer is there and makes an exact transcript
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of what the judge says. We have never had any difficulty in meeting the suggested abuse that Professor Higgins speaks of, that after the charge, some
shrewd or unscrupulous attorney will get the last word to the jury. That is
more dangerous in theory than in practice. I have never known it to be done.
It is always the custom after a judge has charged the jury, for counsel who
desire to note an exception to* the refusal to give some specific request, or to
take an exception to some portion of the charge that he does not agree with,
to come up with the opposing counsel to the bench, and in whispered conversation which the jury cannot hear, to note the exception; and if any attorney
should undertake to make that objection from his seat in order to reach the
jury, he would not go very far before the court would see to it that that was
a matter that affected only the court and counsel, and not the jury, and of
course the lawyer would not be permitted to influence the jury in that way."
judge Russell: "The court would have the last say on the iuling."
Judge De Courcy: "Yes, but subject to exception. With no knowledge
of written charges it is pretty difficult for me to make comparisons. But here
are twelve men; in the majority of criminal cases the issues are almost entirely
of fact. If the jury have the issue clearly placed before them; if they are
instructed as to some of the general principles that will enable them to weigh
evidence; if they are put upon their honor to realize that their duty is to get
at the truth in the conflicting testimony, there is not much in the way of law in
the average criminal case that calls for instruction, and what is given can better be given in the ordinary colloquial manner that a man uses in oral speech
easily understood by the jury, stated in a manner calculated to make them
understand it, rather than to put in statements of abstract or even concrete
principles of law, in phraseology which the average juror does not understand
and may entirely misconstrue. The court can explain those-things when it
comes to the propositions of law. Here is a specific issue raised; the defense
is self-defense. If that issue is raised it is a perfectly simple thing to explain
briefly what the principle of self-defense means, and concretely, if they believe
such and such facts claimed, are proven, that constitutes a perfect defense; and
if such and such other facts are proved, it does not. Thre is no trouble in
making the jury understand. I cannot at this moment recall a criminal case
where a new trial was granted because of misdirection in the charge. Of course
there are some; but they are very few. I must say that, because apparently in
this part of the country the written charge is not unusual. Perhaps in respect
to the oral charge, since you are not familiar with that practice, the objections
may be somewhat theoretical. I have never known any other. It has been
in use in our commonwealth for more than a century. I think I can say that
it has given universal satisfaction. I have never heard any suggestion of
changing to a written charge."
Judge Gemmill: "I am glad Judge De Courcy has made the statement he
has. It comports with our own experience and with the general idea of the
committee. I want to suggest, however, something in reference to what he
said in regard to publishing exact figures as to the reversals in the several
states. I am suie the judge will appreciate the fact that that will require a
very large amount of work, and only emphasizes the need of some system of
statistics.
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"Our Supreme Court lately collected siatistics for the last ten years of all
reversals and other disposition of cases in the Supreme Court, and that will
be published within the year. It is to be hoped all courts will do that, and then
we will know where we stand.
"But in response to these questions, but two chief justices in the United
States complied with the suggestion of Judge De Courcy. Chief Justice Winslow was one. He very fully expressed it in this language: 'Of this number
five were reversed on the merits, six for erroneous rulings on evidence, thirteen
for errors in instruction or refusal to instruct,'
"Chief Justice McLean of Iowa replied: 'In 199 appeals there were 53
reversals; eighteen on erroneous instructions, eleven insufficient instructions,
nine erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence.'
"The Chief Justice of Georgia responded as follows: 'On errors in instructions, admission or rejection of evidence, 240 affirmed, 37 reversed.' The
exact figures are very desirable, but the committee in the length of time that
we had could not think of undertaking that task."
Judge Reid, of Wisconsin: "I was a little surprised at the figures for the
reason that I have examined the reports for the last two and a half years in
Wisconsin, and there were 36 cases reported in the last eight volumes. Out of
these 36 there were only two reversals-that is, two reversals where a new
trial was granted. There was one reversal on a writ of error taken by the
state."
President: "This report covers five years, and certainly in last two or
three years the proportion in Wisconsin is much lower. I have not the exact
figures, but j have no doubt Judge Reid is right. Whether the court has seen
the light or not I leave to your own judgment. During that five years the
legislature has passed an Act which the court has used and honestly attempted
to put into operation; that is an Act which specifically, both in civil and criminal cases requires that the Appellate Court shall not reverse a case for procedural error unless it appears that there has been substantial injury to the
defeated party.
"Now, that question has been touched upon here, whether the Appellate
Court can do that, that is, whether the Appellate Court sitting and simply seeing the printed" record can be sure that it knows whether an error is substantially. prejudicial. It truly is a difficult question; and yet it does seem that
there must be some such rule, if the Appellate Court is to be something more
than a court where mere logic is to be chopped. After an experience of 20
years on the Appellate Bench, it seems to me that with reasonable certainty an
Appellate Judge who examines the case carefully can say whether or not most
of the errors which are charged to have been committed, or which may in fact
have been committed, are of such class.
"I think that is a thing which the Appellate Courts of this country must
come to ultimately.
"That matter of having so large a percentage of cases reversed on erroneous instructions or refusal to instruct seems to me very interesting; and it

makes this second recommendation of the committee of course a very important one. In this state the trial judge has the right to charge juries orally, and
always has had, though most of them I think are given in writing. But this
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attracts me: the requirement that the exception must be taken in the presence
of the jury and before it has retired from the box. In the presence of the jury
would seem almost to justify Professor Higgins in his objection-in the presence of the jury. If I should go up and whisper an objection to the judge, that
could hardly be said to be in the presence of the jury in any fair sense. But
my attention is called to that expression before the jury has retired from the
box. There are sometimes quite serious legal questions arising in criminal
cases. Is not that an extreme requirement of the defendant's attorney, that
he should take his exceptions before the jury has retired from the box? I grant
you that it seems to me that he ought not to be allowed to take it weeks afterward, at any time during the term. There is an abuse there, of course."
Judge Gemmill: "I think it was infended that he must make his objection before the jury has retired from the bar."
President: "You mean the objection must be made?"
Judge Gemmill: "Yes."
President: "rs that the idea?"
Judge Gemmill: "Yes, and that is the way it was originally drafted."
should be made in open court, so that
President: "Is it the idea that it.
all can hear it?"
Judge Gemmill: "In open court. That is the federal practice and the federal statute. It means that the objection, whatever it is, must be made before
the jury has retired from the bar, made in open court, so as to be heard by
all. That is the statute of our own and some other states."
President: "That might work injustice perhaps at some time. You take a
criminal case, where a number of close legal questions arise; the defendant
possibly is defended by a young lawyer or perhaps by one who does not think
quickly. This requires him to jump to his feet at the moment the charge is
-completed and make his objection. It seems to me that that is requiring a good
deal, and perhaps too much. Why should it not be sufficient if it wererequired
to be made before the jury had returned a verdict, and at such time that the
trial judge might correct it? The jury is out sometimes for hours; and in

such case as I have mentioned, where there is an inexperienced attorney looking over the charge or having it read by the reporter, he discovers that here
is something quite important to which he failed to make objection. The jury
is still out; and if he then calls the attention of the court to it, the court has

ample time to remedy the error if there is one."
W. 0. Hart, New Orleans: "I notice on page 120 that from my own state
of Louisiana, the statement is made that most reversals are caused by improper
arguments of district attorneys and erroneous rulings of trial courts. I recall
only one case where the verdict of the jury was set aside because of improper
argument of the district attorney. Most of the cases reversed with us, as
stated here, are on erroneous rulings of trial courts. In our state the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction in criminal cases where the punishment is death, imprisonment at hard labor, or a fine not less than $300, or imprisonment for-at
least six months; but this jurisdiction covers only the law. The Supreme Court
has no jurisdiction of the facts; and if the trial judge has trenched upon the
facts in any form, that would be cause for reversal. Our Supreme Court has
held that no matter what the error may be,"the judgment will be reversed and
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the verdict set aside and the case remanded, upon the theory that it is impossible to tell how far the error may have influenced the jury in its verdict.
"Now, in reference to the charge, under oui: law it must be iii writing if
requested by the defendant; but the Supreme Court has held that if the charge
is taken down by the stenographer as given by the judge, that that is a charge
in writing; and that is the course usually followed regarding objections that
rtust be made in the presence of the jury and in open court, so that everybody
can hear." * * *
Mr. Bird, of Wisconsin: "One sufficient reason for not concurring
in the
recommendation to limit exceptions to the charge, and objections by counsel to
the time of the charge is, that in my judgment, the question of exceptions is
not a matter of legislative reclamation at all. We are getting to the point
where we must leave that to court rules. I think also, that such legislation as
is proposed and as they have in many states would not be efficacious. The result
will be that it will force us as practicing attorneys, in order to be on the safe
side, to go up and except seriatim to the charge. Nothing is thus accomplished
except that we have got ourselves in a position to urge objections later; and if
we have a little time to take 'exceptions, as we do, that usually cuts out many
objections that we would otherwise make."
It was moved by Mr. Bird that the latter part of the second recommendation of the committee be not concurred in.
Judge Carter, Chicago: "I have no hard and fast opinion on this question.
I think a resolution of this kind should not be adopted. -I am n6t in favor of
adopting any recommendation with reference to this report. In my judgment
it should be held as a matter of information rather than recommendation,
especially as only a few of the members are here, and you can see there is a
wide divergence of viev. I have had a great deal to do with written instructions, and I have positive views on the question; but you cannot make any hard
and fast rule. My own idea was, and I think that this was the purpose of the
Institute, not so much in our meetings here to propose certain things to be done,
but to give a fund of information that-all the states and all the country can
draw from." * * *
Mr. Bird's motion was then withdrawn and the report of the committee was referred to the executive board.

